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Luxury goods are selling well and the growth of the industry has barely been slowed 
down by the Asian crisis (Les Echos, 04-30-1998, 09-25-1998; Le Figaro, 04-06-1998; 
Financial Times, 04-24-1999). As in many other growth markets, though, good results are 
coming together with a fair amount of turmoil. Many changes are redefining environmental 
conditions and new challenges are creating significant turbulence for players in the industry at 
a global level (Ecole de Paris, 1998; Woman’s Wear Daily, 02-10-1998; Libération, 03-06/07-
1999). Our question in this paper is whether, in the face of such global trends, luxury goods 
companies have reacted and attempted to adapt. We are interested by changes and evolutions 
with an impact on organizational structures but also by the potential redefinition of 
managerial roles and competencies.  
In periods of severe environmental dislocation, organization theory points to the need 
for speed of reaction and flexibility (March, 1991; Lewin and Stephens, 1993; Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998; Volberda, 1998). In dynamic environments, the efficient management of 
stable sets of organizational competences is not enough to ensure organizational performance 
or survival (Sanchez, Heene and Thomas, 1996). There is a need to take risks, to improvise, 
and to follow uncharted routes (Weick, 1998; Barrett, 1998). The organizational form of the 
future should thus not only allow for the systematic ‘exploitation’ or ‘leveraging’ of existing 
competences. It should, at the same time, leave some space for adaptive ‘exploration’ or new 
‘competence building’ (March, 1991; Heene and Sanchez, 1997). In this context, the meaning 
and role of management are likely themselves to evolve and the question still remains very 
much open of which managerial competencies will come to be required in tomorrow’s 
organization.  
The objective of this paper is to determine how such transformations are concretely 
playing out within the luxury goods industry. While luxury goods are generally intended for 
use, they are also characterized by their ‘symbol intensity’ (Ravasi and Phillips, 1998). 
Luxury objects are associated with intangible features or dimensions that pertain to the realm 
of meanings and aesthetics and give these objects their marginal value. A defining 
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characteristic of luxury goods companies is thus that they satisfy not only the material but 
also the symbolic needs of their customers. As a consequence, the luxury goods industry can 
be readily associated with cultural industries in general – defined as industries producing 
goods and services that ‘are valued for their meaning rather than for any intrinsic usefulness 
they may possess’ (Ravasi and Phillips, 1998; Crane, 1997).  
The symbol intensity characteristic of cultural industries in general and of the luxury 
goods industry in particular makes them by necessity quite porous to pressures from the 
surrounding environment and quite sensitive to changes in that environment (Crane, 1997; 
Guillén, 1997). Performance and survival in these industries after all hinge upon a fragile fit 
between the worlds of meanings created by the organizations and the worlds of meaning 
suggested or desired outside organizational boundaries. The surrounding environment being, 
in our contemporary world, increasingly turbulent and in a state of permanent flux, we thus 
hypothesize that organizations in these industries would have to be particularly adaptive and 
innovative in order to survive. Thus, the luxury goods industry is not only interesting in itself. 
It could emerge, we believe – and this is also certainly true of cultural industries in general – 
as a kind of laboratory for organizational transformations and managerial evolutions where 
insights could be gained and lessons could be learnt of possibly much wider applicability.  
Building upon the first results of a large-scale comparative study on the luxury goods 
industry, we identify evolutions and trends in organizational and managerial terms over the 
recent period in that industry. In the face of global challenges and significant environmental 
turbulence, we try to identify the ways in which organizations in that industry have reacted 
and adapted. We look in particular at organization design but also at emerging patterns with 
respect to managerial competencies. Part of our question is whether the global nature of 
challenges leads to common solutions and answers or whether different paths emerge, 




 A classic task of organization design has been the alignment of organizational features 
with organizational goals and objectives. Traditionally, the relationship was defined as linear, 
from the rational decision-maker, at the top of the organization, to strategic planning, the 
latter in turn driving structure (Barnard, 1938; Chandler, 1962). In this context, the 
management of human resources amounted mostly to the distribution of individuals, on the 
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basis of their skills, knowledge, or experience, to the set of functional positions and jobs that 
made up the emerging structure.  
In time, and ever since the 1960s, organization theorists have come to question such an 
understanding of organization design as being a purely internal process. Defining the 
organization as an open system, they have put forward the idea of a necessary fit between 
organizational structures and a number of contingency factors (Burns and Stalker, 1961; 
Donaldson, 1982, 1985). In early versions of contingency theory, the causal arrow ran from 
contingency factors to organizational forms, the former determining the latter (Woodward, 
1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Somewhat more complex arguments have since then been 
made that point to interaction and co-evolution between contingency – and in particular 
environmental – factors and organizational features (Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lewin, Long and 
Carroll, 1999). The survival and effectiveness of organizations appear to hinge, in these 
arguments, upon the right – and essentially dynamic – match between strategic decision 
making, organizational capabilities, and environmental constraints or contingencies.  
To approach this issue of dynamic contingent fit, an effective theoretical framework is 
that of competence-based strategic management (Sanchez, Heene and Thomas, 1996; Heene 
and Sanchez, 1997). The organization can be defined as a set of resources. In particular 
environmental conditions, survival and performance depend upon the ‘ability of (each) 
organization to sustain coordinated deployments of resources in ways that promise to help 
that organization achieve its goals’ (Heene and Sanchez, 1997: 7). This ability can be labeled 
‘competence’ and firms engage in ‘competence leveraging’ when they deploy existing 
resources or ‘competence building’ when they acquire and use new assets (Sanchez, Heene 
and Thomas, 1996). Resources, organizational structures, and strategies should co-evolve, the 
framework tells us, with environmental conditions through a feedback loop process. And they 
should be quite different in turbulent and complex environments from what they are in stable 
and simple ones.  
Under stable environmental conditions, rigid and tightly coupled forms of organization 
could be quite efficient and allow for a systematic exploitation, or adequate leveraging, of 
existing resources. But in complex and turbulent environments, the literature tells us, flexible 
and loosely coupled organizational solutions, creating space for adaptation, exploration, and 
the building of new competences, are better adapted (March, 1991; Volberda, 1996; Heene 
and Sanchez, 1997). There is little doubt that the end of the twentieth century is a period of 
significant environmental dislocation. Most industries are having to function in increasingly 
turbulent, ambiguous, and hypercompetitive environments (Volberda, 1998; Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998). As it turns out, flexibility and competence building indeed appear to be 
key features in pioneering experiments today by leading firms in search of fit with their 
turbulent environments (Taylor, 1991; Koza and Lewin, 1999).  
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In fact, the organization of the future emerges as a ‘nearly decomposable system’ 
(Simon, 1996), a modular portfolio of organic and entrepreneurial entities, resources, and 
competences. According to Simon (1996: 193), ‘the potential for rapid evolution exists in any 
complex system that consists of stable subsystems, each operating nearly independently of the 
processes going on within other subsystems’. Strategic management, in those conditions, 
means the close and constant monitoring of the portfolio of organizational modules, 
resources, and competences, in dynamic fit with changing and sometimes unpredictable 
circumstances. In turbulent environments, the competence of managing competences – 
leveraging and building them – thus becomes a higher order capability necessary for 
organizational survival and performance.  
In this context, human resource management turns out to imply much more than job 
description and control (Lawler, 1994). Behind most organizational resources and 
competences lay in fact individuals (Zarifian, 1988; Lawler, 1997). Individuals are only 
partially defined by their skills, knowledge, and experience. They are themselves better 
characterized as bundles or portfolios of competencies, a number of which remain untapped 
or underutilized in most organizations. Some of these competencies may be technical or 
functional and thus related to a particular job. Others are behavioral, that is very much linked 
to personal traits and motives, social roles, and constructed self-image and as such much more 
readily transferable from one job to another.  
A key challenge, in the organization of the future, will be the management of these 
individual portfolios of competencies and the next frontier for strategic management is bound 
to be human resource management. In effect, the adequate management of individual 
competencies could emerge as a way of operationalizing the ‘competent organization’, the 
ultimate objective being an alignment between individual competencies and organizational 
competences, in dynamic fit with changing environmental constraints and opportunities. This 
is only likely to take place through a full integration of strategic decision making, 
organization design, and human resource management (Ferrary and Trepo, 1998).  
 Such an understanding of organizations leads us quite far away indeed from 
traditional ‘one-best-way’ structural models (Taylor, 1911; Chandler, 1962). It also obviously 
implies to step away from classic definitions of leadership and management (Barnard, 1938; 
Mintzberg, 1973). Instead, what is needed – and what we hope to some extent to contribute in 
this paper – is more empirical research and theory building on managerial competencies for 
the organization of the future, in the context of significant environmental dislocation.  
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METHODOLOGY AND THE LUXURY GOODS INDUSTRY 
We have launched a large-scale and comparative project on the luxury goods industry, 
with a two-step methodology. The first step was to create a rich database for about eighty 
companies worldwide. The relevant population for this initial sample was defined using the 
two leading studies on the industry (Eurostaf, 1998; Cerna, 1995). Different sectors or product 
domains were included – fashion, perfume and cosmetics, watches and jewelry, and 
accessories or leather goods. Compiled from a systematic press review, from annual reports 
and from the analysis of other available written sources of information, our database lists for 
each company overall turnover, sales structure by region and product category, after tax 
operating margin throughout the period 1995-98 as well as growth for the period between 
1992 and 1997. It also plots the main events and changes that have affected each of these 
companies during the period – changes in ownership structure, redefinition of structure or 
strategy, replacement of key managers or creators and the reorganization of distribution, 
amongst others. 
As a second step, we selected fifteen companies that altogether made up more than 
50% of the overall turnover in that industry. This smaller sample included some of the 
companies with the fastest growth in the industry (15 to 39% per year during the 1992-97 
period) but also a number of companies with very slow growth (from 3 to 8%). Table 1 
provides some basic information on these fifteen companies.  























L’OREAL 4600 (luxury 
brands) 
12.7 Perfumery & cosmetics 5  
ESTEE LAUDER 3900 8.5 Perfumery & cosmetics 2 1 
VENDOME 2200 5 
(93-97) 
 











Fashion 1  
TIFFANY 1350 14.4 Jewellery  1 
GUCCI 1130 39.8 Accesories  1 
HERMES 920 10.2 Accessories 1  
HUGO BOSS 850 3 Fashion   
ESCADA 775 2.7 Fashion  1 
CLARINS 710 13.2 Perfume & cosmetics   
DONNA KARAN 650 15.1 Fashion   
VERSACE 500 28.1 
(94-96) 
Fashion  1 
PRADA 450  Accessories   
BULGARI 360 30.7 Watches & jewellery  1 
MISCELLANEOUS    1 2 
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TOTAL SAMPLE 27 000   15 10 
TOTAL INDUSTRY 50 000     
 
Our objective for this second stage was to go into more in-depth studies for each company in 
the reduced sample, using essentially qualitative tools. We are in the process of running a 
series of open-ended interviews with top managers. Altogether twenty five such interviews 
were planned, fifteen of which have been conducted and analyzed to date. Interviews lasted 
between one and two hours and they were taped and typed. They were conducted using the 
critical events approach (Flanagan, 1954) and the interview preparation guide is laid out in 
table 2.  
Table 2: Interview Preparation Guide sent in advance to interviewees 
 
“In order to prepare for this interview, which should last approximately one hour and thirty minutes  
and will be taped, we would like you to think about the following issues: 
1 - What is your definition of luxury ? 
2 - Think of the two events which have had the most impact on your professional career (one of which 
since your arrival in the company you are working for now) 
3 – Can you please identify and relate in details your two main professional successes 
4 – Can you please identify and relate in details your two main professional failures” 
 
Our initial aim was to determine, through these interviews, the behavioral competencies that 
managers in the industry were finding particularly useful in their daily business dealings. 
Open-ended discussion around a few critical moments – revealing both successes and failures 
– in the professional life of interviewed managers also allowed us in the end to identify 
perceptions about the likely or necessary evolutions in the industry with respect to managerial 
competencies but also in terms of strategic orientation and organization design. 
 As already argued, a defining specificity of the luxury goods industry is that the 
marginal value of the objects produced stems from the intangible dimensions or sets of 
representations with which these objects are associated (Cerna, 1995; Gutsatz, 1996). While 
the perimeters of the luxury goods industry were fairly stable throughout a large part of the 
20th century, things have recently been changing (Eurostaf, 1998). Over the past two decades, 
luxury goods companies have had to face a more and more turbulent environment. 
Competition has increased significantly and the long undisputed dominance of French firms 
has come to be challenged. French luxury goods companies now represent only 50% of the 
total worldwide turnover of the industry. Foreign competitors, mostly from the USA and from 
Italy, have managed to impose themselves and, from marginal players, they have come to 
redefine the rules of the competitive game. At the same time, the economic boom in Asia and 
the fall of the Berlin wall have pushed back the frontier for luxury goods companies. 
Characterized by an emerging elite hungry for symbols of status, the new markets have 
become eldorados for these companies which have had to face, as a consequence, the double 
challenge of an overall increasing demand and of its diversification. In the meantime, 
traditional markets – Western Europe and the USA – were becoming more mature and thus 
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more difficult mostly due to changes in customer behavior. The original elite target groups 
were being supplemented by a growing mass of middle class customers with quite different 
symbolic needs. Better educated and more sophisticated western customers were becoming 
increasingly able to manage their own choices and therefore much more demanding. While 
looking for perfect quality and in search of meaning, these customers also came to value 
service, price and immediate satisfaction. This undeniably represented a significant challenge, 
in particular for these companies that had been used to merely push their products on markets, 
relying on the intrinsic features of these products to trigger sales.  
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL SOLUTIONS: DIFFERENT PATHS TO FLEXIBILITY 
  In the face of such radical market transformation and heightened competition, luxury 
goods companies have had to react. A cursory scan of structural changes over the recent 
period shows that many have felt the need for greater organizational flexibility (Bizot, 1998; 
Woman’s Wear Daily, 02-10-1998, 04-22-1998, 06-09-1998; Wall Street Europe, 06-11-
1999). When probing further, though, we found that reactions were not exactly the same 
everywhere, even though the emerging challenges were global, that is common to the luxury 
goods industry as a whole. There appeared to be, in fact, several different paths leading to 
organizational flexibility in the luxury goods industry. Two main factors could help explain 
differences in that respect – the weight of history on the one hand and the strength of 
competitive and market pressures on the other. For a particular organization, the weight of 
history depends upon its age and upon the past notoriety of its name. It is also related to the 
degree of embeddedness of the organization within a professional or national tradition. The 
extent to which, on the other hand, competitive and market pressures are being felt is 
inversely proportional, in any particular case, to the capacity of firms to resist these pressures, 
either through organizational slack or by creating protective barriers.  
 These two factors could theoretically combine in many different ways but a systematic 
assessment of conditions in the industry shows that the dividing line cuts in fact across both 
national and product dimensions. Table 3 proposes a schematic typology, along these lines, of 
the population of luxury goods companies.  
 
Table 3: A typology of luxury goods companies   Strength of Market Pressures  
 
  Strength of Market Pressures 
  High Low 
 
Weight of 
High  French perfume and cosmetics - 
French Jewelry. 
French fashion  
French leather goods 
   History Low  Italian and American : Fashion, 








At one end, French fashion and leather goods companies belong to long established 
and institutionalized professional and national communities that have historically set up 
around themselves solid boundaries and thus managed to somewhat buffer competitive 
pressures. In the face of significant environmental dislocation, these companies have been 
relatively slow to react and adaptation has been significantly limited by the weight of tradition 
and by institutional constraints. The emerging path towards organizational flexibility seems to 
be, in this case, what we call below the ‘umbrella holding’ – an organizational form that is 
still a few steps away from the internal network.  
At the other end, Italian and American players in the luxury goods industry have been 
altogether much less burdened by the weight of history and much less protected from 
competitive pressures. French cosmetic firms and jewelers are somewhere in between, deeply 
embedded in a long lasting professional and national tradition and nevertheless quite 
vulnerable to market pressure and competition. In all those cases, environmental turbulence 
and competition have hit hard and individual firms have had to adapt much more rapidly. The 
common path to organizational flexibility that emerges here is the external network, of which 
we identify two variants – one more closely associated with Italian and the other with 
American luxury goods companies.  
 
French fashion and leather goods: from craft organization to the ‘umbrella holding’
 For years, and at least until the 1960s, the luxury goods industry was clearly 
dominated by French companies (Grumbach, 1993). The business of designing, making, and 
selling luxury objects was then defined as a craft and highly labor intensive process, where 
goods were either custom-made or else produced in very short series. The clientele was small, 
loyal, and homogenous, mostly drawn from within the ranks of the French aristocracy and 
upper middle class (Grumbach, 1993; Crane, 1997). Fashion was undeniably the jewel of this 
industry and in this particular sector, the setting up of protective rules that strictly defined 
what was and what was not luxury fashion or haute couture further institutionalized the 
predominance of French firms. The French professional association – the Chambre Syndicale 
de la Haute Couture – was responsible for enforcing these stringent rules, significantly 
restricting, de facto, the possibility for entry into the industry (Crane, 1997).  
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 The first mover’s advantage of French firms, which they thus early on managed to 
institutionalize, allowed them to impose their own rules of the game on a worldwide level. 
French firms set the boundaries of the industry, imposed their definition of the ‘luxury object’ 
and dictated, in the process, organizational solutions as well as a particular model of 
leadership (Grumbach, 1993; Dumas, 1998). The French definition of luxury placed the value 
of the object in its own intrinsic aesthetic features. These aesthetic features, in turn, were seen 
to depend upon the creative power of the main designer and upon a craft-like, high quality, 
detail oriented and fully controlled process – from creation and design to manufacturing and 
distribution (Ecole de Paris, 1998). The main designer, who also traditionally often owned 
and ran the business, was thus in French companies the pivotal figure around whom 
everything seemed to revolve. As artist and craftsman, he or she ensured that the process as a 
whole was fully integrated (Dumas, 1998). This step-by-step monitoring, which amounted in 
fact to a quality control integrated upstream and rigidly centralized, was essentially achieved 
through a reliance on traditional savoir faires – or traditional craft techniques – inherited from 
the past. French haute couture houses – Christian Dior, Yves Saint Laurent, Christian 
Lacroix, amongst others – and leather goods producers, Louis Vuitton or Hermès, have 
historically exemplified this model and to a significant extent, still do today (La Tribune, 03-
25-1998; Libération, 03-06/07-1999). 
When tradition and the past define best practice to the extent they have done in French 
fashion and leather goods companies, changes are bound to be perceived as threats and 
external pressure as essentially a source of disturbance. And in fact, when markets and 
environments started to become increasingly complex and turbulent, French fashion and 
leather houses initially set out to change the world rather than themselves. One of their first 
reactions was to call upon the national government for protection and to use institutionalized 
arrangements, such as the haute couture rules and strict timetable, to keep foreign competitors 
out of the official industry boundary for as long as possible (Grumbach, 1993; Ecole de Paris, 
1998). Another temptation was to reinforce centralized and in-house controls at all levels. 
Starting in the 1950s, French luxury goods companies had seen the first clear signs that their 
traditional customer base was shrinking, if not altogether disappearing. A number of French 
houses thus decided at the time to turn to licensing and partial outsourcing in order to reduce 
costs and to extend their product range and customer base. Over the more recent period, 
increasing turbulence and the emergence of challengers and competitors from quite different 
horizons have brought about, in a few noteworthy cases, a reversal of this strategy. Several 
French companies, which had, at some point, outsourced some of their manufacturing or 
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distribution, have recently reintroduced them within organizational boundaries – Christian 
Dior or Courrèges being examples amongst others.  
In a parallel move to tightening integration and controls, French fashion and leather 
goods houses have also been strongly reasserting the central place of the product, as the 
ultimate bearer of value – ‘truth is in the product’ (Dumas, 1998). The flow, over the past few 
years, of new creators into French companies can easily be interpreted as a series of symbolic 
gestures in that direction. The mission of John Galliano at Dior, Alexander McQueen at 
Givenchy, or Marc Jacobs at Louis Vuitton is and will be to reinvent, for these companies, the 
magic of the product and thus of their name. They are to create objects, the aesthetic 
properties of which should be their own main selling point and should drive outside desires 
rather than follow them. The personalization and the cult-like hype that have developed 
around these individuals, within and outside the fashion community, confirms that they are 
very much identified with and treated as the almighty and self-sufficient ‘creator’ of the 
French tradition.   
At first sight, it would therefore seem that French fashion and leather goods companies 
have been confronting environmental challenges by essentially reasserting and protecting 
their traditional organizational recipes. These companies appear to have dealt with external 
disturbances by sealing off as much as possible organizational boundaries and limiting 
external dependence. At second glance, though, it is possible to identify, beyond the apparent 
stability, a path towards organizational flexibility, albeit a peculiar and quite original one. 
This path is exemplified by the construction, over the past twenty years, of the Louis Vuitton 
Moët Hennessy (LVMH) conglomerate or, as we choose to label it here, ‘umbrella holding’. 
Bernard Arnault, founder and present Chairman of LVMH, has brought together, through the 
years, a number of formerly independent luxury houses. Under the LVMH umbrella, one 
currently finds luxury fashion houses such as Givenchy, Kenzo, Christian Lacroix, Céline, 
and Christian Dior as well as a number of luxury companies producing accessories (Louis 
Vuitton, Loewe), perfumes, wines, or spirits. More recently, LVMH has diversified further 
into selective retailing and distribution (Choez, 1998; Le Figaro, 03-16-1998).  
As of today, LVMH is still a conglomerate in search of identity. Recent developments, 
though, appear to show that it is in the process of evolving into a truly flexible internal 
network (Woman’s Wear Daily, 12-10-1997). Each entity within LVMH has significant 
autonomy and retains more or less full control over a still largely integrated process – from 
design to production and distribution. There is a clear awareness within LVMH that this 
integrated process is where the value of French luxury brands lies. At the very same time, top 
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managers in the umbrella holding underscore the need for systematically creating and 
developing interfaces between individual luxury goods houses. The idea is to realize 
economies of scale by rationalizing certain activities at the level of the group – marketing, 
distribution, or even production (Martin, 1998; Wall Street Europe, 03-12-1998). While the 
umbrella holding trajectory, sketched out in figure 1, is still very much in construction, we 
propose that it represents an original path to organizational flexibility. In the medium to long 
term and in the context of a turbulent environment, this type of internal network, allowing 
both autonomy and synergies, might be the only chance of survival for individual French 
luxury houses. 










The emergence of the umbrella holding model made particular sense in the French 
context. It reflected, we have argued, the peculiarities of national constraints and traditions. 
As it turns out, though, this model seems to arouse interest well beyond French national 
borders. Armani or Calvin Klein are openly courting LVMH and seriously considering an 
integration into the umbrella holding (Financial Times, 10-07-1999). Patrizio Bertelli, Prada’s 
Chairman, praises LVMH’s strategy and seriously considers, apparently, following it himself. 
He argues that, under present conditions, a possible path is ‘to acquire other luxury goods 
brands that could not only coexist but exploit synergies wherever possible’ (Women’s Wear 
Daily,12-10-1997, 06-09-1998). Recent developments show that action has followed intent 
and that Prada is indeed in the process of constructing a group, using the LVMH umbrella 
holding as a model (Woman’s Wear Daily, 03-29-1999, 08-31-1999, 10-07-1999). 
 
Italian and American challengers: two variants of the external network 
 While a key challenge for French fashion and leather goods companies over the past 
two decades lay in striking the right balance between tradition and adaptation, new players 





Common Services (or potentially so) 
Logistics, Marketing, Advertising,  
Distribution, Manufacturing, Subcontracting 
Individual house 
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tradition. These new entrants were for the most part Italian or American companies. They 
perceived environmental turbulence as a source of opportunities rather than threats and 
fostered a radical redefinition of the rules of the game that could only be to their benefit. So as 
to gear up for increased competition, changing markets and rapidly evolving technologies, 
Italian and American challengers developed original and innovative organizational solutions. 
To follow the expansion of markets, they significantly increased their productive capacities 
through mechanization and standardization or systematically relied on subcontracting and 
licensing. In order to handle increased competition, the greater sophistication of customers, 
and the multiplicity of their profiles, they designed flexible and speedily reactive structures, 
directly tuned into the ‘world of the street’.  
 Over the recent past, the flexible external network has therefore been emerging as a 
new structural solution within the luxury goods industry. While most French fashion and 
leather goods houses have stressed in-house manufacturing and insisted upon a full control 
over distribution channels, their Italian and American competitors have subcontracted 
manufacturing or licensed distribution without hesitation. Ralph Lauren and Calvin Klein 
have done it for their core and non-core apparel lines, Gucci and Ferragamo for their core 
leather goods lines, and Tiffany’s for silverware and jewelry. Probing further, though, one can 
point to a number of important differences between Italian and American luxury goods 
companies. This leads us to differentiate between two variants of the external network – one 
which is more closely identified with Italian and the other with American companies. These 
variants differ essentially along two dimensions. In the Italian variant, the networks of 
partners and subcontractors have tended to have a smaller and much more stable membership 
base than in the American variant. The extent of outsourcing, on the other hand, has been 
much more significant in the American variant, with only a minimal range of activities being 
kept in-house.  
Italian companies have generally set up three layers in their manufacturing activity. 
The key products of their core business have been kept in-house – couture apparel for 
Versace, women’s ready-to-wear and accessories for Trussardi, some of the leather goods for 
Gucci. For the rest of their core business, Italian companies have tended to subcontract 
manufacturing to a tight network of industrial partners and craft workshops over which they 
have kept strict control (The Economist, 04-11-1998; Le Monde, 10-10-1998; Le Figaro 
Economique, 05-27-1999). This particular type of flexible external network has fit in nicely 
with the traditional ‘industrial district’ organization characteristic of the Third Italy (Brusco, 
1982; Goodman et al., 1989; Djelic, 1998). The foundation of trust, stemming from a 
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common institutional and cultural background, has made quality control and the management 
of interfaces a relatively easy exercise (Granovetter, 1985; Powell, 1990; Lazerson, 1995). 
Finally, the manufacturing of non-core products – eyewear or perfumes for example – has 
tended to be licensed off, in Italy or elsewhere. For distribution, Italian companies have either 
worked through fully owned stores or through a franchise network over which they have kept 
tight control.  
This particular variant of the flexible external network, sketched out in figure 2, is 
characteristic of the Italian luxury goods industry as a whole – and in particular of companies 
like Armani, Gucci, Versace, or Prada (The Economist, 04-11-1998; Le Monde, 01-18-1998, 
05-27-1999). But it also defines a number of non-Italian companies, particularly in jewelry 
(Cartier or Tiffany’s) or in accessories (Coach, ST Dupont, Montblanc, Baume et Mercier). 
Increasingly, many of its key features are to be found, furthermore, within the French perfume 
and cosmetics industry (Bizot, 1998).  

















 American companies have generally gone one step further, pushing the logic of the 
flexible external network organization even further. They have retained in-house only a 
narrow range of activities, which they have defined as being their strategic or core 
competences. They have kept full control over important choices with respect to design and 
product lines, the selection of materials, brand management (marketing, advertising, 
promotion, merchandising), the handling of quality control tools, the monitoring of 
subcontracting partners or licensees and, finally, the elaboration of a distribution strategy. 
Manufacturing 




    Design             Marketing 
                     Advertising 
                         Promotion 












(Stable group of subcontractors) 
Distribution 
Franchising 
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Manufacturing has been entirely licensed off or, for the core business, subcontracted – top of 
line apparel for Ralph Lauren, apparel for Dona Karan. Design, creation, or brand 
management themselves – in all but their strategic dimensions – have been in part outsourced 
to free lance designers, communication and advertising agencies, or consultants. Distribution 
in the United States has generally taken place through licensees and outlet stores, although 
Ralph Lauren has had a few fully owned stores. In foreign countries, American fashion 
companies have tended to distribute through a network of licensees. A striking example of 
this particular variant of the flexible external network, presented in summary form in figure 3, 
is Calvin Klein where both manufacturing and distribution have been fully outsourced, and 
where the core organization has been reduced to creation, public relations, communication, 
merchandising and control of the brand. In the end, the American variant of the flexible 
external network goes quite far in the direction of what the literature on new organizational 
forms has labeled the ‘virtual organization’ (Davidow and Malone, 1992).  
 













In both the Italian and American variants of the flexible external network, creation and 
conception – design – and brand management – marketing, advertising, promotion, 
merchandising – are thus being defined as equally strategic core competencies. As a matter of 
fact, Italian and American companies, but also some French firms in cosmetics or jewelry 
start from and emphasize the management of the brand rather than the management of 
products. They build upon concepts, those intangible goods that define the brand, deducing 
and declining from them product lines and products but also communication tools, marketing 
strategies, even the design of stores (Nueno and Quelch, 1998; Fulconi, 1998; Dainville, 
1998). The search for such an overall coherence is ultimately the responsibility of the creator, 
who in the Italian or American model is not only an artist and a designer but also a brand 
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manager (Dautresme, 1998; Woman’s Wear Daily, 02-11-1998). In an environment where 
customers are not only consumers but are also increasingly looking for products or brands 
that reflect in part their own symbolic needs (Roux, 1997), managing a brand naturally does 
not mean freezing it. Rather, it implies steering along its coherent evolution – or more 
exactly co-construction with the ‘street’. In the Italian or American type of organization, 
creators are ‘street-wise’, even if each one speaks a different street. They feel the trends, the 
representations and the needs of their customers and they integrate these to construct or 
reconstruct within a coherent and consistent frame the brand’s identity (Dautresme, 1998; 
Fulconi, 1998).  
In organizational terms, this particular understanding and definition of the luxury 
business has led to knocking down many traditional boundaries. Internal boundaries have, on 
the one hand, been redrawn and lowered, those in particular that divided work in the 
traditional craft organization along functional lines separating creation from management in a 
manner that in fact often exacerbated or created conflict. Vertical boundaries have also been 
crossed over, information and decision flows increasingly going both ways. The power 
structure has been somewhat diluted and decentralized to tune in more directly the 
organization to the ‘street’. External boundaries, in the meantime, have become quite porous 
and this increasingly early on in the process, including at the creation stage where the 
customer has been brought in, not only as a set of material needs but also as a set of 
representations. These external boundaries have altogether become shifting and difficult to 
identify, we have shown, with the development of flexible external networks linking a core 
organization to outside partners that have taken on some of the activities traditionally kept in-
house by the craft organization.  
The shifting geometry of these external network types of organizations is the source of 
their flexibility and adaptability; it also is their main point of fragility. The challenge stems, 
particularly in the American case, from the great number of interfaces that make the problem 
of control extremely acute. While Italian firms have created relatively small networks by 
drawing from a pool of locally embedded subcontractors, American firms have tended to rely 
on arm’s-length ties and multiple spot contracts. The monitoring of interfaces is, in those 
conditions, a very central task and at the same time a very complex one. In an industry where 
value creation lies in absolute coherence, a strategy that relies on outsourcing or 
subcontracting requires particularly strict control mechanisms.  
A number of very recent developments do show that monitoring and control are 
indeed the Achille’s heel of the external network, particularly of the American type. Donna 
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Karan has found it hard, over the recent years, to articulate the core of her company with its 
peripheral modules and this is clearly at the source of the difficult situation in which her 
company finds itself today (Les Echos, 03-24-1998). Ralph Lauren has recently announced 
that it was buying back a large number of its licensees, thus bringing distribution into closer 
and more direct control and reducing in the process the number of interfaces. As to Calvin 
Klein, while the company has been, to this day, particularly effective in managing and 
monitoring a multiplicity of interfaces, an interesting question is what will happen when 
Calvin Klein himself steps down. The recent announcement that the Calvin Klein company 
was up for sale and that, amongst possible bidders, it favored LVMH (Financial Times, 10-
07-1999) could be interpreted as an indirect acknowledgment that current organizational 
arrangements might not be viable in the medium to long term  
 
 
MANAGERIAL COMPETENCIES – REALITIES AND EXPECTATIONS  
 While organization design and the alignment of structure and strategy with 
environmental conditions is undeniably a key challenge in the luxury goods industry, another 
key question is that of finding the persons that could most effectively take on this challenge 
and handle managerial tasks. Historically, the way in which this search has been handled has 
been through the adoption of risk reducing strategies that were institutionalized, in fact, well 
beyond the boundaries of the luxury goods industry. A recruiting or promotion decision could 
be made by relying, on the one hand, on the assessment of the track record of successes and 
failures of a particular individual throughout his or her career to that point – whether in the 
company, in the industry or even in other industries. Choices and decisions could also be 
made simply on the basis of the legitimacy granted by a diploma, that formally guaranteed a 
level of knowledge and a number of definite skills. 
To this day, patterns of recruiting, promotion and career development for managers in 
the luxury goods industry exemplify these two risk-reducing strategies or a combination 
thereof. In luxury goods companies, managers are often hired because they have been 
successful somewhere else.1 This could have been at a competitor’s, within the industry, but 
also increasingly at Procter and Gamble or Unilever since recent evolutions in the industry 
and its environment have made mass-marketing skills increasingly valuable. More and more, 
                                                
1 This creates a pattern within the industry of managers rotating from one company to another. See, for example, 
Gabriella Forte going from Armani to Calvin Klein and then to Liz Claiborne. Woman’s Wear Daily (6-01-1997) 
documents and gives a detailed analysis of these moves.  
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hiring decisions have also been made on the basis of a diploma and within the luxury goods 
industry as everywhere else the MBA has been making inroads, essentially because it 
formally guarantees certain types of skills and knowledge.  
 In a complex and rapidly changing environment, though, industries and companies 
will increasingly have to learn to function in unique and always renewed conditions. Past 
successes are, as a consequence, bound to be less and less predictive of future ones. And in 
fact, performance is likely to be more and more dependent upon the capacity – of the 
individual and of the company – to break existing routines, built from past successes, and to 
come up with innovative answers and solutions (Argyris, 1977; Senge, 1995). In this context, 
recruiting or promoting a manager only on the basis of what he or she has done before or 
somewhere else might not – and far from it – be a risk-reducing strategy anymore. In fact, 
relying merely on experience or specialized knowledge as selection criteria would 
increasingly appear to be inadequate. To go along with the transformation of both 
environmental and organizational conditions, the management of human resources will 
apparently have to shift its focus away from jobs, knowledge and experience and towards 
individual competencies and in particular transferable competencies of the behavioral type 
(Lawler, 1994).   
 We defined earlier behavioral competencies as personal and ‘underlying’ 
characteristics that are very much linked to personal traits and motives, social roles and 
constructed self-image (Klemp, 1980). Behavioral competencies are much more instrumental 
in shaping behavior, in the longer term, than acquired skills or knowledge. They may explain 
effective or superior performance in a given role and context but they also are very much 
transferable from one job to another. The importance of behavioral competencies thus lies in 
the fact that they not only have an impact on performance in a given job but also on the 
unfolding and on the development of the professional life of an individual (Boyatsis, 1982). 
More often than not, though, these competencies remain implicit and the individual is but 
rarely aware of them. They are furthermore rarely nurtured and very much under-utilized in 
the organizational context. Behavioral competencies have not yet become a key tool for the 
management of human resources, and this is particularly true within the luxury goods 
industry. They should increasingly help structure, we believe, the recruiting and promotion 
process. Since they are to a large extent socially constructed, in our definition, they could also 
be ‘learnt’ and ‘worked upon’, thus becoming the central articulation of a company level 
human resource planning policy. In the process, they would likely become, we propose, a key 
source of competitive advantage for the organization.  
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 We decided to look at managerial competencies in the luxury goods industry with this 
particular framework in mind. Identifying competencies and in particular behavioral ones can 
only be done indirectly by determining first the actions of an individual in particular 
circumstances and then the consequences of those actions. This naturally calls for a 
qualitative type of methodology. Studies of that sort (Boyatsis, 1982; Hay-McBer, 1996) have 
produced detailed lists of competencies. Those lists have then generally and classically been 
used to rate individuals along a given scale for each single competency in turn. There are 
three main weaknesses, we believe, to existing studies from which we constructed three key 
hypotheses.  
First of all, existing studies tend to search for commonalities across industry 
boundaries. By very construction, they are thus often unable to pick up the specificities of a 
given industry or potential differences within the boundaries of a single industry. Our first 
hypothesis (H1) was that, due to the peculiar nature of the luxury goods industry, a number of 
managerial competencies specific to that industry could be identified.  
A second weakness of existing studies is that they generally lack a systematic cross-
national comparative perspective. We have shown earlier that, in the luxury goods industry, 
organizational and structural arrangements were very much embedded in national and 
institutional contexts. Our second hypothesis (H2) was that even more than organizational and 
structural arrangements, patterns of behavioral competencies were bound to be nationally, 
institutionally and culturally embedded.  
We believe, finally, that by treating competencies as essentially independent from 
each other, existing studies are significantly losing in explanatory power. Our last hypothesis 
(H3) was that certain competencies would tend to be found together while others never and 
that we would be able to identify clusters of related competencies. This could make possible 
the elaboration of a typology of managers and create the basis for a significant redefinition of 
human resource management policies. Indeed, individual performance in a particular situation 
may not depend so much on rating high on one or two particular competencies but rather on 
exhibiting a given set or cluster of related competencies.    
 The fifteen interviews we conducted, twelve of which were of French managers, 
appear to validate two of our three hypotheses – first that there are competencies specific to 
the luxury goods industry (H1) and second that competencies generally work in clusters (H3). 
Interviews still to be conducted will target American and Italian managers, which should 
allow us to test the hypothesis of national embeddedness (H2).  
Emerging behavioral competencies 
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A preliminary list of managerial competencies, along with their precise definitions, 
had been drawn from the existing literature (Boyatsis, 1982; Hay-McBer, 1996). The first step 
of the analysis was to identify references in our interviews to behavioral competencies – both 
to the competencies that were and to those that were not mentioned in the existing literature. 
Identification was done independently by both authors and then systematically cross-checked. 
Competencies that could not be integrated into the existing classifications were labeled and 
singled out as potentially specific to the luxury goods industry. At the same time, a profile 
was sketched out for each interviewee, defined by the set of competencies with which he or 
she was associated.  
In a second step to the analysis, we tried to categorize the emerging list of 
competencies. The cognitive system of individuals has two clearly distinct layers (Gutsatz, 
1999). The level of perceptions is defined by his or her system of beliefs, attitudes and 
opinions while the level of cognition refers to the way a particular individual reasons, 
analyzes and manages information. Perceptions can be further differentiated by introducing 
the idea of ‘relational objects’ (Harris, 1994). There are four key relational objects – the self, 
others, the environment and action, which makes four categories at the level of eprception. By 
adding a cognition category – attitude towards problem solving – we ended up with five 
categories that allowed us to classify the full list of competencies emerging from our study. 
These five categories are presented in summary form in figure 4.  
 Figure 4: Five main categories of competencies 
 









Testing hypothesis 1: the specificity of the luxury goods industry 
Altogether, fifty different competencies emerged from our interviews and a full list is 
given in appendix 1. Fourteen of these competencies stood out particularly because they did 
not appear in the results of existing studies (Boyatsis, 1982; Hay-McBer, 1996).  Since 
existing studies have, by very construction, crossed over industrial boundaries and searched 
for similarities, we propose that these fourteen competencies, listed in table 4, are specific to 
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Self  construction 





 goals and action 
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the luxury goods industry. We believe, furthermore, that they might explain to a significant 
extent individual performance in the management of luxury brands.  
Table 2: Luxury brand management competencies 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHERS 
05.  Managing differences 
O7. Generate involvement by setting an example 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT 
E2. Sense of proximity 
E4. Sensitivity to weak signals 
E5. Spiral perception of time 
E6. Linear perception of time 
E7. Aesthetic sensitivity 
E9. To absorb – to immerse oneself into a given situation 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS GOALS & ACTION 
G8. Do it orientation 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS PROBLEM SOLVING  
P1. Holistic vision of situations 
P5. Intuition 
SELF CONSTRUCTION 
S6. Acceptance of ambiguity or uncertainty 
S9. Freedom of mind 
S10. Breaking norms and rules 
 
 
Three out of these fourteen competencies stand out in striking contrast to others that had 
emerged in the full list.  
• ‘Generate involvement by setting an example’ contrasts with ‘Involving through rational 
arguments’ 
• ‘Holistic vision of situations’ contrasts with ‘Analytical vision of situations’ 
• ‘Do it orientation’ contrasts with ‘Achievement orientation’ 
It seems that two very different profiles can be identified, that of a ‘rational’ manager that 
would not be specific to but nevertheless present in the luxury goods industry and that of an 
‘intuitive’ leader that would be more specific – although there is a high likelihood that this 
second profile could be found within cultural industries in general and not just in the luxury 
goods industry. This result would tend to confirm an hypothesis made in a previous paper by 
one of the authors (Gutsatz, 1996).  
Testing hypothesis 3: towards structures of competencies 
A systematic comparison of the fifteen interviews and individual sets of competencies 
showed, on the other hand, that certain competencies tended to appear together while others 
never. We identified five major patterns of related competencies that altogether would seem 
to define the ideal profile of a manager in the luxury goods industry – the manager of the 
future. We sketch out this particular profile in figure 5. Four out of the five structured patterns 
that were identified – the manager as innovator, the manager as ‘do-er’, the manager as 
rational decision maker and the manager as team builder – fit in quite well in fact with 
tendencies existing in other industries and theorized in the literature on new organizational 
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forms and competency-based management. The fifth structure or pattern – the manager as 
vision captor – we see as being more specific to the luxury goods industry in its more recent 
evolutions. 
Figure 5: The competent luxury brand manager – the profile of the future 
 
              Structured pattern 1            Structured pattern 2 









Structured pattern 3                           Structured pattern 4        








                                          Structured pattern 5     







Although none of our interviewees exhibited this five dimensional, ideal profile, a major 
finding is that there was great regularity in the types of structured patterns that were always 
associated with each other in an individual person. This allowed us to identify a small number  
of different profiles. ‘Innovator’, ‘Do-er’ and ‘Vision Captor’ were generally found together 
(in eight cases). The profile that emerged from this combination we have already identified 
and labeled the ‘Intuitive leader’. ‘Rational decision maker’, on the other hand, was always 
found to be associated with ‘Innovator’ (altogether three cases). This second profile we 
labeled the ‘Rational leader’. The identification of these two profiles is perfectly consistent 
with what had been found when testing hypothesis 1.    
 
(G4) Persistence  
(G1) Risk-taking  
(S10) Breaking rules  
 
 
(O1) Teamwork, cooperation  
(O7) Involving by example  
(G8) ‘Do-it’ orientation  
(E1) Concern for accuracy  
 
(E3) Flexibility  
(E4) Sensitivity to weak signals  
(E5) Spiral sense of time  
(E7) Aesthetic sensitivity  
(P1) Holistic vision of situations  
 
(O1) Teamwork and cooperation  
(O2) Interpersonal understanding  
(O3) Development orientation  
(O4) Confidence in people  
(O5) Managing differences  
(O6) Listening and responding  
 
 
(O8) Involving through rational arguments 
(E6) Linear perception of time  
(GA6) Achievement orientation 
(P2) Analytical vision of situations  
(S10) Breaking rules  
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? ? 
 While these two profiles are clearly independent, we found that they could both be 
associated with the ‘Team builder’ structured pattern. We can therefore surmise that the 
attitude towards others, of which the ‘Team builder’ pattern is an expression, is an 
independent dimension and has no direct connection with the attitude towards goal and action, 
the attitude towards the environment, self construction or the attitude towards problem 
solving. The fact that the ‘Team builder’ structured pattern is ‘pure’ – that it contains only 
competencies from the ‘attitude towards others’ category and not a mix as is the case of other 
structured patterns – can be interpreted as providing further confirmation. If our claim is 
indeed true, further interviews should allow us to identify another structured pattern in direct 
contrast to the ‘Team builder’. This structured pattern, which we label here very tentatively 
‘Autocrat’ would reflect a radically different attitude towards others. This would be consistent 
with what is known of certain leaders of the luxury industry that have not yet been 
interviewed. The combination of the two profiles identified in this paper with contrasting 
attitudes towards others would allow us to draw a fairly convincing map of the current state of 
management in the luxury goods industry. A tentative version of this map is proposed in 
figure 6.  
 




 Altogether, the most striking about our results might be the contrasting tendencies, 
which they reveal. It appears, in fact, that there are two quite distinct sides to the luxury goods 
industry that run parallel to each other On the one hand, history and tradition define 
organizational solutions to a significant extent and this is particularly true in French fashion 
and leather goods companies. At the very same time, one can point to innovative 
organizational evolutions, including in that part of the industry. The same appears to be true 
of managerial competencies. We find that very different managerial profiles coexist within 
the industry – from the quite traditional ‘Rational leader’ to the ground breaking and more 
Autocrat 
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original ‘Intuitive leader’. We explain this particularly acute tension between tradition and 
modernity by the coexistence, in the luxury goods industry, of two radically different 
aesthetic perspectives. Each of these two perspectives or paradigms generates a different 
definition of ‘luxury’ and therefore a quite different approach to the management of luxury 
goods companies. 
 The first such aesthetic perspective, generally labeled ‘modernist’, has dominated for 
years architecture and design. Objects, in this perspective, are defined as having intrinsic 
aesthetic properties, which they owe to their designers or creators. Within the luxury goods 
industry, this translates into a definition of the luxury object where value is in the object itself 
– ‘truth is in the product’ (Dumas, 1998). The luxury object, in turn, is the material reflection 
of the unique genius of the original creator or designer. Emerging from this aesthetic 
perspective is thus the idea that the identity of a particular luxury company is shaped by its 
history and that a large share of its value lies in the traditional practices inherited from the 
past. Another direct consequence is the key role attributed to the creator or designer, whether 
the original one or its spiritual heir, in the workings of the company. In this traditional 
understanding of the luxury goods company, the creator should retain full control over the 
product at all stages – from creation and design to manufacturing and then distribution. The 
role of the organizational structure is to create a protective framework around the creator and 
his or her products, so as to buffer them from any form of external tampering. This means that 
the modernist luxury goods company is likely to be extremely wary of change and that it will 
be tempted to avoid as much as possible external influences. Most French fashion and leather 
goods companies still tend to function within this modernist aesthetic perspective (Grumbach, 
1993; Crane, 1997; Ecole de Paris, 1998; Dumas, 1998). And we have described, in this 
paper, how such a perspective has translated in organizational and managerial terms.  
 In striking contrast to this long dominant aesthetic perspective, the postmodern 
argument is that there is no such thing as an objective and absolute definition of aesthetic 
value. This perspective has recently made significant headway within the luxury goods 
industry. The idea behind the postmodern perspective is that there is not one but an infinite 
number of discourses, co-constructed by the creator and the spectators or consumers. Applied 
to the luxury goods industry, this means that value does not lie in the objects themselves but 
in the set(s) of representations that the objects – or the brands – conjure up in a particular 
group or population (Cerna, 1995; Gutsatz, 1996; Ecole de Paris, 1998). In this context, brand 
management thus naturally becomes very significant and turns out to mean much more than 
systematic attention to the quality and consistency of products and services. Brands are 
‘spaces for dreams’ or spaces where customers can satisfy their symbolic needs. Pleasure, 
desire, self-image, or a reflection of their own values are what individuals look for in luxury 
goods consumption (Roux, 1997). Brands are therefore more than historical legacies shaped 
by the creator’s original vision and values. They are a constantly moving co-construction in 
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which external actors, including customers, have significant input. From this perspective, 
luxury goods companies and their structures should be open, flexible, and speedily reactive to 
external influences and to what is happening in the wider cultural, social, and institutional 
context.  
 In the luxury goods industry, a pioneer of the postmodern perspective was the 
American Ralph Lauren, who defined his brand around a particular lifestyle, in that case the 
New England WASP lifestyle. Other Americans but also Italians soon followed suit – Calvin 
Klein, Giorgio Armani, Gucci, or Prada amongst others. By creating around their names a 
coherent ‘space for dreams’ that spoke to and integrated the symbolic needs of particular 
groups of customers, these companies have been able to price beautiful but rather standard 
ready-to-wear products at a Dior or a Chanel level. All in all, Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, 
Armani, Gucci, or Prada have in fact managed to establish themselves as luxury brands 
without building upon a product legitimacy that had traditionally been symbolized, in the 
fashion industry, by a haute couture activity. A similar type of process and evolution has 
taken place in perfume and cosmetics, American firms once more giving the lead but with a 
significant impact this time on French players (Jellinek, 1997; Dautresme, 1998; Dainville, 
1998).  
 This postmodern aesthetic perspective has had significant consequences in 
organizational and managerial terms, which have been documented in this paper. It also has 
fit in quite well with the nature of contemporary changes in luxury markets. Customers in the 
luxury goods industry – but also in many other industries – are becoming increasingly diverse 
in profile as well as more demanding. They want a product or brand to reflect some of their 
own needs, desires, and expectations. They are not merely passive consumers, rather they 
want to be active co-constructors or co-creators. The diversity, overall, of symbolic needs and 
expectations and thus the multiplicity of potential ‘spaces for dreams’ means that a ‘street-
wise’ creator, having a good sense of the symbolic needs of a given population and strong 
financial backup, can relatively easily create a new brand and successfully develop it. This 
has been the formula for the success of companies like Ralph Lauren, Calvin Klein, Gucci, 
Prada or Etro and has introduced a significant amount of competitive pressure in the luxury 
goods market (La Tribune, 04-07-1998; Le Monde, 03-06/07-1999).  
 At the same time, recent developments would tend to show that the success stories and 
radical organizational innovations associated with this particular aesthetic perspective might 
be more fragile than they appear at first sight. In particular, the American model of external 
network seems to be very much an ‘idol with feet of clay’. The key challenge with this 
particular path to organizational flexibility is the management and monitoring of a 
multiplicity of interfaces, all of which are critical to the overall coherence of the brand and 
therefore to the value of products. This challenge is likely to become particularly acute when 
the company considers internationalization. In these conditions, the umbrella holding emerges 
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as an interesting alternative. Originally developed to allow traditional luxury houses, 
embedded in a modernist aesthetic perspective, to survive under conditions of environmental 
turbulence, this particular path to organizational flexibility seems to arouse a significant 
amount of interest in the industry as a whole. Whether this might lead, in time, to relative 
organizational convergence in the luxury goods industry around the internal network or 
umbrella holding model is quite another question, which it is much too early to take on.  
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ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHERS 
O1. Teamwork and cooperation 
O2. Interpersonal understanding 
O3. Development orientation 
O4. Confidence in people 
O5. Managing differences 
O6. Listening and responding 
O7. Involving by setting example 
O8. Involving through rational arguments 
O9. Acceptance of contradiction 
O10. Directness 
O11. Organizational awareness 
O12. Impact and influence 
O13. Building business relationships through personal relationships 
O14. Building business relationships through contractual relationships 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ENVIRONMENT 
E1. Concern for accuracy 
E2. Sense of proximity 
E3. Flexibility 
E4. Sensitivity to weak signals 
E5. Spiral perception of time 
E6. Linear perception of time 
E7. Aesthetic sensitivity 
E8. Broad scanning 
E9. To absorb – to immerse oneself  
ATTITUDE TOWARDS GOALS & ACTION 
G1. Risk taking 
G2. Initiative 
G3. Making quick decisions 
G4. Persistence 
G6. Achievement orientation 
G7. Task orientation 
G8. "Do it" orientation 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS PROBLEM SOLVING  
P1. Holist vision of situations 
P2. Analytical vision of situations 
P3. Conceptual thinking 
P4. Synthesis 
P5. Intuition 
P6. Redefining problems 
P7. Analogical thinking 
P8. Recombining informations 
P9. Decisive insight 
SELF CONSTRUCTION 
S1. Self control 
S2. Self confidence 
S3. Technical expertise 
S4. Learning from failure 
S5. Genuineness 
S6. Acceptance of ambiguity or uncertainty 
S7. Resilience 
S8. Sense of being unique 
S9. Freedom of mind 
S10. Breaking norms and rules 
 
 
